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Pakistan’s economy has grown faster on average than many other low- and middle-
income countries over the past two decades. But several countries in Southeast Asia have 
fared even better. This paper focuses on factors that explain Pakistan’s relative growth 
performance. In addition to more traditional factors believed to determine growth, this 
paper looks particularly at the role of differences in the quality of human capital. The 
cross-country empirical results suggest that accumulation of physical capital and 
improvements in the quality of institutions have the largest pay-offs in terms of achieving 
higher growth, but that better education and health care also have a significant impact. 
Investment in these areas will increase the possibility of Pakistan entering a virtuous 
cycle of high growth and improved living conditions for the population. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For over two decades, the Pakistani economy has been growing on average at 
the very respectable rate of about 5 percent per year, although with considerable 
fluctuations around the mean. This rate of growth has been higher than in many other 
low- and middle-income countries and has been comparable to that of other South 
Asian countries. But it has been significantly below the growth rates experienced by 
countries in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Figure 1 
shows the development of per capita GDP over the period 1979–2004 in a sample of 
72 low- and middle-income countries, as well as in two sub-groups of South Asian 
and Southeast Asian countries and in Pakistan. It shows that Pakistan has done fairly 
well compared to the developing countries group, but that real per capita GDP in 
Southeast Asia expanded by more than twice as much during this period. 
In the past few years, as the pace of growth accelerated, Pakistan has started to 
catch up with the countries in Southeast Asia. In the second half of the 1990s, growth  
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Fig. 1.  Economic Growth and Education 
 





Note: Group Growth rates are simple unweighted averages.































































































rates in Pakistan had fallen to an average of 3 percent per year, barely exceeding 
population growth.
1 The government of General Parvez Musharraf that came to 
power in 1999 put macroeconomic stabilisation and broad-based structural reforms 
at the top of its agenda, and the economy witnessed a dramatic turnaround. Growth 
increased to over 8 percent in 2004-05, one of the highest levels in the world. The 
question is what can be done to repeat the performance of 2004-05 and sustain 
growth rates at a high level in the future so as to make a significant dent in the 
prevailing poverty levels. 
Pakistan’s growth performance in recent years is a puzzle. Compared to 
other high-growth developing countries, Pakistan’s investment rate, educational 
levels, and quality of institutions are all low. Yet the economy has grown 
relatively fast. This paper focuses on the factors that may help explain the 
 
1See, for example, the recent study of growth in Pakistan by Kemal, Musleh-ud Din, and Qadir 
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growth performance of Pakistan. In addition to the more traditional determinants 
of growth, such as investment levels, it will look particularly at whether the 
quality of human capital may have been a defining factor. School enrollment 
ratios are quite low in Pakistan and so is health care spending. Figure 1 also 
shows the average years of schooling, obtained from a data set assembled by 
Barro and Lee (2000). It shows that the average educational attainment in 
Pakistan has been low compared to other South Asian and Southeast Asian 
countries. And while these numbers are a little dated, the overall picture is 
unlikely to have changed much in recent years. Since there is evidence in the 
literature of a link between human capital and economic growth,
2 this would 
imply that investing more in human capital could help Pakistan maintain the high 
rates of economic growth that is has recently been experiencing. Indeed, with 
growth accelerating, businessmen increasingly list a shortage of skilled labour as 
a constraint to further expansion. Policy-makers in Pakistan recognise this 
constraint and accordingly have attached great importance to strengthening 
education. 
The link between investing in human capital and economic growth matters for 
an additional reason. A large part of the world’s population continues to live in 
poverty, and the focus of economic researchers and policy-makers has increasingly 
shifted toward designing policies that benefit the poor. There is widespread 
agreement that economic growth is necessary to help reduce poverty, but that growth 
by itself is not sufficient. Pakistan is a good example of this, as despite the relatively 
high growth rates, its social development is weak and poverty remains widespread, 
with about an estimated 30 percent of the population living in poverty. Investing in 
human capital, by creating a more productive work force, will lead to higher future 
growth and incomes. And higher social spending on education and health care can 
also benefit the poor directly by improving their current living conditions, as well as 
their future prospects. 
The paper is structured as follow. Section II will review selectively the recent 
literature on economic growth, including findings regarding the importance of the 
quality of human capital. Following this, Section III presents the results of an 
econometric analysis of growth in a large group of low- and middle-income 
countries during 1980–2002, adding a number of education and health indicators to 
more conventional factors explaining growth, such as macroeconomic policies, 
initial income levels, and institutional quality. Section IV describes how Pakistan 
performed relative to the overall sample, and to countries in South Asia and 
Southeast Asia in particular. Based on these results, the concluding section will offer 
some suggestions as to how Pakistan could maintain higher rates of economic 
growth into the future. 
 
2See, for example, Barro (2001), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Bils and Klenow (2000), and 
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II.  THE RECENT GROWTH LITERATURE 
Raising the rate of growth in a sustained manner is one of the most important 
issues in economic theory and policy. There is a vast and growing body of literature 
that attempts to answer the question of how to promote growth.
3 But despite the 
voluminous literature, there seem to be no reliable and unambiguous answers to this 
question. For almost any study that finds a particular factor important for growth, 
there is a study that reaches a different, if not opposite, conclusion. 
First let us start with some good news. According to the recent literature on 
“growth accelerations”, periods of sustained strong growth are a fairly frequent 
phenomenon. Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) find that a country has a one-
in-four chance to experience a growth acceleration sometime during a decade, with 
an acceleration defined as real per capita growth of 2 percent or more lasting for at 
least eight years. They also find that growth accelerations tend to be correlated with 
increases in investment and trade, with real exchange rate depreciations, and with 
political regime changes. Not all accelerations last equally long, however. External 
shocks, for example, tend to produce growth accelerations that eventually fizzle out, 
but economic reform is a significant predictor of accelerations that are sustained. 
But there is also some bad news. The same study finds that growth 
accelerations tend to be highly unpredictable. While growth accelerations do tend to 
be correlated with such factors as an increase in investment or trade, the vast 
majority of growth takeoffs are unrelated to these standard determinants. Moreover, 
growth takeoffs typically fail to materialise when these standard conditions are 
indeed favourable. Similarly, Rodrik (2003) argues that igniting economic growth 
and sustaining it are two quite different things. Again some good news, as he finds 
that it often takes only small reform steps to jump-start the growth process. But 
sustaining growth requires continued institutional reforms that improve the resilience 
to shocks and maintain productive dynamism. Rodrik (2003) emphasises that there 
are a few first-order economic principles that need to be adhered to in order to 
maintain strong growth: protection of property rights; market-based competition; 
appropriate incentives; and low inflation (he calls it “sound money”). These 
principles can translate into very different policy packages, however, for individual 
countries. Reformers, therefore, appear to have substantial room for creatively 
packaging these principles into institutional designs that are sensitive to local 
opportunities and constraints.  
There is now a broad consensus, however, regarding at least a number of 
“stylised facts” in the economic literature. Sala-i-Martin (2004) offers a broad 
summary of the literature on cross-country growth analysis. He notes that: (a) there 
is no simple determinant of growth, i.e., there is no “magic bullet”; (b) the initial 
 
3See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Bosworth and Collins (2003), Mankiw, 
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level of income is the most important and robust variable, and thus conditional 
convergence is the most robust empirical fact; (c) the size of the government does 
not appear to matter much, but what is important is the quality of government and its 
policies; (d) the relationship between human capital and growth is weak, although 
some measures of health, such as life expectancy, are robustly correlated with 
growth; (e) more open economies tend to grow faster; and (f) institutions are 
important for growth.  
Similarly, studies that use a growth accounting approach in analysing cross-
country differences in economic growth, for example Bosworth and Collins (2003), 
Abed and Davoodi (2004), and Kemal, Musleh-ud Din, and Qadir (2002), find that 
the increase in production factors alone cannot explain economic growth. Or, as 
Easterly and Levine (2001) have put it, it is the “A” in the standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function Yt = At f (Kt, Lt) that is key to growth, where Y is output, K the 
capital stock, L the quantity of labour, and  “A” is generally taken to be total factor 
productivity. A substantial part of the differences in growth is accounted for by 
differences in total factor productivity.
4  
The question that follows is what drives changes in total factor productivity? 
Total factor productivity in effect provides a measure of the efficiency of the 
production process—the quantity of output that can be produced with a given 
quantity of inputs. Changes in total factor productivity reflect a myriad of 
determinants that influence growth, but which the measured increases in factor 
inputs do not account for. In other words, total factor productivity should not be 
taken as only an indicator of technical progress, as it can reflect the influence of 
other factors as well. Policies and institutions, for example, also affect the efficiency 
of an economy in much the same way as technology does. An economy with stable 
economic conditions or good institutions is more efficient in the sense that it takes 
less input to produce the same amount of output. Macroeconomic instability or weak 
institutions on the other hand lower incentives to invest—in physical and human 
capital, as well as in technology—to work, and to produce. Empirically, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that good policies and institutions are important 
determinants of growth, and human capital is also essential for putting such policies 
and institutions in place. Finally, total factor productivity also reflects the quality of 
labour. A better trained or skilled worker is capable of producing higher levels of 
output than an unskilled one.  
There are now many empirical studies establishing the link between 
increases in the level of education—or more broadly, increases in the quality of 
human capital—and economic growth. Higher educational attainment is expected 
to have an impact on economic growth by improving the productivity of workers. 
 
4This is true in Pakistan as well. If one takes the most recent high-growth period 2003-2005, then 
capital accumulation accounted for 25 percent, labour force growth for 31 percent, and total factor 
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An educated workforce is better able to implement new technologies and generate 
ideas for improving efficiency. But while at the microeconomic level studies have 
typically found a strong relationship between income and educational attainment, 
macroeconomic studies so far have found conflicting results. Early studies, 
including those of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) found a significant positive association between cross-country differences 
in the initial level of education and subsequent rates of growth. A 1993 World 
Bank study of the East Asian miracle listed the higher level of human capital as a 
major factor behind the rapid development of a number of East- and Southeast 
Asian countries.  
At the time, however, other studies, including those by Bils and Klenow 
(2000), Pritchett (2001), Easterly and Levine (2001), and Temple (2001), that 
examined the relationship between years of schooling and changes in economic 
growth failed to find a significant association. Bosworth and Collins (2003) also fail 
to find a robust link between educational quality and growth, and particularly cannot 
distinguish educational quality from more general concepts of the quality of 
institutions. Some researchers suggest that the link between education and growth 
may be weak because the benefits of education are not fully realised due to a failure 
to integrate improvements in education with other important elements of the growth 
process. That is, the creation of skills offers no benefits if the infrastructure and 
institutions do not exist to make use of them. In other words, there is a 
complementarity between human capital development and other growth determinants 
such as infrastructure and institutions.
5 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
While growth regressions clearly have their limitations, most empirical 
analyses have utilised the regression approach to examine the characteristics and 
determinants of economic growth in large groups of countries over a long period.
6 
Basically, from the studies that have regressed various indicators of output on a vast 
array of potential determinants, a core set of explanatory variables has emerged that 
has been shown to be consistently associated with economic growth. The importance 
of other variables has to be examined conditional on inclusion of this core set of 
variables in the specification. 
 
5A simple explanation for the lack of association between human capital and growth may be that 
the former is not properly measured; see Cohen and Soto (2001). This is an important issue since most 
studies use primary and/or secondary school education as a proxy for human capital formation. It is not 
clear that such indicators capture skills-development of the work force. 
6Using single-country time series makes it difficult to disentangle the cyclical and secular 
components of growth. Using filters to smooth the growth series throws out potentially meaningful 
information. Furthermore, most developing countries do not have long time series available on many of 
the relevant variables. As such, cross-country analysis, despite its well-known drawbacks, has become 
standard fare in empirical growth studies. Human Capital and Economic Growth  461
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function, Y =  AK
α(LH)
1–α  , augmented to account for the quality of 
labour, with the level of output (Y) determined by capital inputs (K), labour inputs 
(L), and the level of educational attainment (H) or, more generally, a measure of the 
quality of human capital, also covering health indicators, such as life expectancy. By 
assuming a steady-state constant value for the inverse of the capital-output ratio and 
a constant rate of depreciation, in the estimations the investment rate can be used 
instead of changes in the capital stock. This has the obvious advantage that it avoids 
measurement problems associated with constructing an artificial series for the capital 
stock. Using this approach, economic growth can be specified as a function of 
investment, human capital, and a set of determinants driving total factor productivity 
(as measured by H). 
A number of different measures are used here to represent the quality of 
human capital. These include literacy rates, average years of schooling, gross 
secondary school enrollment, and life expectancy. Variables that determine total 
factor productivity include the rate of inflation as a proxy for sound economic 
policies and the overall quality of institutions. In addition, given the importance of 
convergence—that is, whether incomes of developing countries are converging 
toward those of higher-income countries—the initial level of income has been 
included. Thus, the basic regression takes the following form: 
       Growth = α1 (Investment) + α2 (Initial Income) + α3 (Macroeconomic Policy) + 
α4 (Institutional Quality) + α5 (Labour Quality) + ε 
This model was estimated for a group of 72 developing countries (including 
Pakistan). Data for real per capita GDP growth, gross fixed capital formation, CPI 
inflation, and per capita income in 1980 were obtained from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook database. Data for gross secondary school enrollment, the adult 
literacy rate, and life expectancy were obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database. Data for average years of schooling were taken 
from Barro and Lee (2000). For institutional quality, the average of four indicators 
compiled by the International Country Risk Guide was used. These indicators were 
rescaled to range from 1–12, and covered bureaucratic quality, corruption, rule of 
law, and government stability. 
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of a cross-section regression of 
the basic growth equation for the sample of 72 low- and middle-income developing 
countries.
7 The dependent variable is average real per capita GDP growth over the 
1980–2002 period. The explanatory variables are also averages over the 1980–
2002 period. The initial income variable is the per capita income in 1980 for each 
country. 
 
7Due to limited data availability, the actual number of observations is generally slightly smaller 
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It can be seen from Table 1 that the variables used to describe economic 
growth account for almost two-thirds of the cross-country variation in growth over 
the period 1980–2002. All of the conditioning variables—investment to GDP, initial 
income, the rate of inflation, and the quality of institutions—have the expected signs 
and are generally highly significant. The finding of a strong negative association 
between initial income and subsequent growth provides a robust support for a 
process of convergence. There is also a strong relation between growth and sound 
economic policies and between growth and the quality of institutions, such as law 
and order, protection of property rights, and the absence of corruption. The results in 
Table 1 basically replicate those obtained in other such studies, and largely confirm 
the stylised facts outlined by Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
 
Table 1 
Growth Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Average Growth of Real 
Per Capita GDP, 1980-2002 
     









































Average Years of Schooling  0.34 
(3.34)** 
    0.23 
(2.04)** 
School Enrolment, Secondary (% Gross)    0.03 
(3.26)** 
   
Literacy Rate (Adult Total, % of People Ages 
15 and Above) 
   0.02 
(1.88)* 
  




R-squared  0.63 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.65 
Adjusted R-squared  0.60 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.62 
No.  Observations  64 67 59 67 64 
Notes:  Estimation is by OLS. T-statistics in parentheses. *Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.  
           ** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
1Average of four indicators, rescaled to range from 1–12, including bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, rule of law, and government stability. Human Capital and Economic Growth  463
Furthermore, the results in Table 1 indicate that a higher quality of human 
capital—that is, higher levels of educational attainment or better health indicators—is 
indeed associated with higher real per capita growth rates. The coefficients for each of 
the education and health indicators used have the expected sign and are highly 
significant. Interestingly, the relevance of the human capital indicators is independent 
of the overall institutional quality. Also, the results furthermore indicate that both 
education and health indicators influence growth independently of each other.
8 
To highlight the relative importance of the various determinants of growth, 
Table 2 shows the standardised Beta coefficients from the equations shown in       
Table 1.
9  These Beta coefficients suggest that raising investment has the biggest 
impact on growth, but that improving a population’s health and education also have a 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Average Growth of Real 
Per Capita GDP, 1980-2002 
     
Investment Ratio (Percent of GDP)  0.46  0.44  0.51  0.44  0.41 
Initial Income (1980 US Dollars, Logs)  –0.56  –0.61  –0.56  –0.63  –0.63 
Inflation (Percent, Logs)  –0.18  –0.16  –0.15  –0.13  –0.19 
Institutional Quality
1  0.39 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.39 
Average Years of Schooling  0.37        0.19 
School Enrolment, Secondary (% Gross)    0.43       
Literacy Rate (Adult Total, % of People   




Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)        0.46  0.30 
1Average of four indicators, rescaled to range from 1–12, including bureaucratic quality, corruption, rule 
of law, and government stability. 
 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN 
What do these regression results imply for Pakistan? Currently, government 
spending in Pakistan on health and education—both as a proportion of GDP and per 
capita—is among the lowest levels in the world, although there has been a significant 
increase over the past few years. Not surprisingly, social indicators are also relatively 
weak. Pakistan ranked 135th out of 177 countries covered by the United Nations 
Development Programme’s 2005 Human Development Index. Pakistan ranked 
particularly poorly in terms of educational attainment, but ranked better in terms of 
life expectancy. 
 
8Of course, they could also have a joint effect as well. This could be tested by explicitly 
introducing an interactive term. 
9The standardised coefficients are what the regression coefficients would be if all the variables 
were measured on the same scale. Mohsin S. Khan  464
Surprisingly, Pakistan’s poor social indicators do not appear to have had a 
major negative impact on its growth performance. Table 3 presents the average 
values of each variable used in the analysis for the entire sample, as well as country 
values for selected countries in South and Southeast Asia. As mentioned previously, 
Pakistan’s average annual rate of economic growth has been about 5 percent, or 
somewhat over 2 percent per capita. This is significantly better than the average 
performance of the 72 countries included in the full sample, where the annual per 
capita growth rate was less than 1 percent, despite education indicators in Pakistan 
being lower than the sample averages. Pakistan’s economic growth rates were 
broadly similar to those elsewhere in South Asia, although India has been growing at 
a faster pace, as has Sri Lanka on a per capita basis.
10 But Pakistan’s performance 
was significantly weaker than China, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, or Thailand. 
These countries recorded real per capita growth rates of 3½–8 percent on average per 
year during the period 1980–2002. Pakistan is clearly not a “tiger” even though its 
growth rate last year was in the same league as the fastest-growing economies of 
Southeast Asia. Sustaining this growth rate over a long period of time, as the 
Southeast Asian economies have done, will be necessary to join the club. 
 
Table 3 
















Pakistan 4.9  2.2  18.6  7.8  5.6  59.5  3.2 
Bangladesh 4.2  2.0  18.9  8.0  3.4  55.5  2.2 
India 5.5  3.4  22.9  8.6  6.6  59.3  4.1 
Sri Lanka  4.5  3.0  25.3  11.8  5.4  70.5  6.2 
Malaysia 6.3  3.5  32.6  3.4  7.9  70.9  6.3 
Singapore  6.9 4.2  36.8  2.1  10.0 75.5 6.0 
Thailand 6.0  4.6  30.9  4.9  7.5  67.5  5.6 
South Korea  6.8  5.6  32.7  6.5  7.7  70.5  9.6 
China 9.5  8.2  37.1  6.6  7.1  69.0  5.0 
Sample Average
1 3.1  0.8  21.3  62.8  5.9  58.5  4.0 
Sources:  IMF World Economic Outlook; World Bank Development Indicators; ICRG; and Barro and Lee (2000). 
1Full sample of 72 countries. 
 
Could Pakistan have achieved higher growth rates if it had invested more in 
its human capital? Earlier studies by Husain (1999) and Easterly (2001) argue that 
Pakistan systematically underperforms on most social indicators for its income level 
and that it could indeed have achieved higher growth rates if it had focused more on 
human capital accumulation. Easterly attributes this “growth without development” 
 
10 For an analysis of growth in South Asian countries, see Guha-Khasnobis and Bari (2000). Human Capital and Economic Growth  465
to domination by an élite, and to ethnic division, which both contributed to low 
levels of spending on health and education. While one can dispute the causes for low 
social expenditures, one cannot deny that Pakistan has some of the worst social 
indicators in South Asia, although there are some signs of improvement in the last 
few years. 
Table 4 shows the contributions to growth, calculated using the regression 
results in Table 1 (specifically using Equation (1)). Growth in the Southeast Asian 
countries has been higher than in Pakistan—or most other countries in South Asia—
predominantly because of higher levels of investment, a better quality of institutions, 
and also because of a higher level of educational attainment. In the sample period, 
investment ratios were significantly higher in Southeast Asian countries than they 
were in South Asian countries, including Pakistan. Similarly, the countries in 
Southeast Asia scored considerably better in terms of institutional quality, while 
average levels of educational attainment in most South Asian countries, with the 
exception of Sri Lanka, were much less than those in Southeast Asia.  
 
Table 4 
Factors Determining Growth: Selected Asian Countries 











Schooling  Residual 
Pakistan 2.2  3.0  –6.0  –0.2  3.4  1.1  0.9 
Bangladesh 2.0  3.0  –5.3  –0.2  2.1  0.8  1.7 
India 3.4  3.6  –5.7  –0.2  4.1  1.4  0.2 
Sri Lanka  3.0  4.0  –5.7  –0.3  3.3  2.1  –0.4 
Malaysia 3.5  5.2  –7.7  –0.1  4.8  2.1  –0.9 
Singapore 4.2  5.9  –8.7  –0.1  6.1  2.0  –1.0 
Thailand 4.6  4.9  –6.7  –0.2  4.6  1.9  0.0 
South Korea  5.6  5.2  –7.6  –0.2  4.7  3.3  0.2 
China 8.2  5.9  –5.9  –0.2  4.3  1.7  2.2 
Sample Average
1 0.9  3.5  –7.3  –0.5  3.6  1.4  0.2 
Sources:  IMF World Economic Outlook; World Bank Development Indicators; ICRG; and Barro and Lee 
(2000). 
1Sample size of 74 countries used in Equation (1) of Table 1 due to missing data. 
 
The results of this analysis suggest that the best way to achieve higher rates of 
economic growth still is to raise the level of investment and to improve the quality of 
institutions. Figure 2 illustrates the link between these two factors and real per capita 
growth and shows where various countries, including Pakistan, are. This finding 
supports  putting  an increased emphasis on increasing private and public investment,  Mohsin S. Khan  466
Fig. 2.  Economic Growth, Investment, and Institutions. 
      IMF ;  ; and  Sources:  World Economic Outlook World Bank World Development Indicators International 
Country Risk Guide.
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while improving the institutional framework. Investment in Pakistan, at around 16-
17 percent of GDP over the past few years, is undoubtedly too low; most fast-
growing countries have an investment ratio of over 25 percent.
11 An increase in 
investment ratio by 5–6 percentage points, as the Government of Pakistan aims to 
achieve over the medium term—to a level comparable to that of Sri Lanka—could 
result in an increase in the country’s annual real per capita GDP growth rate of about 
1 percentage point. In addition, the pace of economic growth in Pakistan can be 
raised further by improving the quality of its institutions. On a scale from 1–12, with 
a higher value representing better institutions, Pakistan had a score of 5.6 on average 
 
11It has been argued that Pakistan’s investment rate is underestimated because investment is not 
properly measured. However, this is only a conjecture as there is no statistical backing for this hypothesis. Human Capital and Economic Growth  467
during 1980–2002. By increasing this score by 1 point—to a level comparable to that 
of a country such as Egypt—Pakistan could raise its real per capita growth rate by 
about another ½ percentage point per year. These values are the targets the 
Government of Pakistan should set for itself. 
But education matters as well. The results suggest that lower investment in 
education in Pakistan at least partly accounted for the growth differences vis-à-vis 
Southeast Asian countries. Figure 3 suggests that the link between growth and 
education appears less strong than that between growth and investment or 
institutional quality, but the link is certainly there.  All  the Southeast Asian countries  
 
Fig. 3.  
 
     IMF ;  ; and Barro and Lee  Sources:   World Economic Outlook W orld Bank World Development Indicators
(2000). 
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can be found in the upper right-hand corner of each of the panels, while South Asian 
countries, except for Sri Lanka, lie on the left side. Pakistan scores better than 
Bangladesh when the education indicator is average years of schooling, but is at the 
bottom of South Asian countries when secondary school enrollment is used as a 
proxy. India ranks higher than Pakistan in all the major determinants of growth, and 
as expected, experienced better growth performance. 
It therefore follows that Pakistan could increase its rate of economic growth 
by investing more in human capital. The government has already started to make 
such investments in the last few years and aims to continue to do more in the years 
ahead. Despite considerable fiscal adjustment, social spending was raised by about 
one percentage point of GDP in the last three years, or by over 30 percent in real per 
capita terms. While the effect that increasing investment in human capital would 
have on growth would be somewhat smaller than that of raising investment or 
improving the overall quality of institutions, the impact would still be significant. 
For example, the average years of schooling received by Pakistan’s population 15 
years and older was 3¼ years. Raising this by 1½–2 years—to the levels of countries 
such as Thailand or Venezuela—would be a major achievement, as it could raise the 
real per capita growth rate permanently by about ½ percentage point per year. 
Improving health care to achieve an increase in the life expectancy of Pakistan’s 
population by five years—to levels comparable to that of countries such as Morocco 
or the Philippines—would add another ½ percentage point to its annual real per 
capita growth rate. Within the region, Sri Lanka is a good example of a country that 
has better social indicators and has achieved somewhat stronger per capita growth 
rates than Pakistan, despite its prolonged ethnic strife.  
Just as importantly, for a low-income country such as Pakistan, besides 
fostering economic growth by having a more productive work force, investing in 
human capital benefits the poor directly by improving their current and future living 
conditions. The majority of people in low- and middle-income countries do not 
possess many assets other than their own human capital. Without assets, their 
economic well-being depends largely on developments that are external to them, 
leaving them vulnerable to adverse circumstances and shocks. The possibility to 
improve their situation will depend to a very large extent on how productive they can 
be. This in turn depends, among other things, on the educational possibilities that are 
available to them. Better education will obviously allow the poor the opportunity to 
get better jobs and better incomes. Over time, this will enable them to start to 
accumulate assets, reducing the risk that they will fall back below the poverty line 
when economic conditions worsen. Pakistan is still very much a society with a small, 
well-educated upper class, a relatively small middle class, and a very large lower 
class that is poorly educated. The potential gains from improving the quality of, and 
the access to, education are therefore enormous. Human Capital and Economic Growth  469
A few caveats before concluding are in order. First, higher spending on 
education (and health care) should be well-targeted to specifically include the poor. 
This implies an emphasis on primary and secondary levels of education and basic 
health care, as opposed to more spending on higher education and more specialised 
health care. The richer segments of the population can be expected to benefit more 
from the latter, which would perpetuate the divide between the poor and the rich. 
Second, given the poor quality and limited availability of government-financed 
education and health care, a growing number of people rely on private service 
providers. The massive expansion in the last decade or so in private schools (e.g., 
Beaconhouse) and universities (e.g., LUMS), as well as private clinics, is clear 
evidence of this trend. The data used in this study does not capture this. Private 
health care and education, however, is naturally not accessible to the poor, thus also 
continuing the divide between the haves and have-nots. Third, care should be taken 
that higher spending on health and education is used effectively. The quality of 
public services in Pakistan, as well as in other low- and middle-income countries, has 
often been poor, due to weak institutional capacity, or other factors, including 
corruption. Higher social spending will, therefore, need to be accompanied by 
improvements in institutional capacity—to ensure that the funds are used efficiently 
and effectively—if it is to have the desired positive effect on future economic growth 
and poverty reduction. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To conclude, the empirical results presented here support the traditional view 
that raising investment and improving institutions are key to achieving higher rates 
of economic growth. But the results also confirm that countries that invest more in 
their human capital do better in terms of economic growth. Higher levels of 
education and better health care result in a more productive work force, increasing 
total factor productivity, and pushing a country’s production function outward. 
Compared to a large group of low- and middle-income countries, Pakistan’s 
performance in terms of per capita economic growth has been better than average 
during 1980–2002 and broadly similar to that of other countries in South Asia. But 
several countries in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Thailand achieved considerably higher rates of economic growth. Besides having 
higher rates of investment and better institutions, the quality of human capital in 
these countries was significantly better than in Pakistan, widening the growth 
differentials vis-à-vis Pakistan. This implies that Pakistan could have achieved even 
higher growth rates, had it invested more in its human capital. Thus higher social 
spending has to be priority in the Government of Pakistan’s development strategy, in 
addition to the need to attract more domestic and foreign private investment and to 
further improve the overall quality of the country’s institutional framework. 
Substantial resources will be required in the coming years to provide better schooling Mohsin S. Khan  470
and health care. But if used effectively, this can prove to be a most worthy 
investment, offering the possibility of Pakistan entering into a virtuous cycle of 
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It is indeed a pleasure for me to comment on Dr Mohsin Khan’s paper. He is 
one of Pakistan’s most renowned and internationally recognised economists. 
It is also good to see Dr Mohsin moving out of his traditional domain of 
monetary economics. Who says a leopard never changes its spots! 
This is a “neat” and “well-constructed” paper with all the elements carefully 
spelled out. I enjoyed reading it and do not have any serious problems with some of 
the broad conclusions reached. 
The paper can be divided into two parts. The first is an attempt to explain 
Pakistan’s relative growth performance.  This is based on cross-country analysis of 
a sample of 72 low- and middle-income countries, including Pakistan, for the 
period 1980–2002.  The second draws on the results of this analysis to suggest 
measures by which Pakistan could further improve and sustain it growth 
performance. 
Pakistan’s growth performance has always confounded its critics. Indeed the 
author acknowledges that “Pakistan’s growth performance in recent years is a 
puzzle”. Here I assume he refers to not just the period of the last few years i.e. 2002–
2005 but the overall period of over 20 years that he covers in his study.  As the 
author convincingly shows  that despite relatively low investment rates, educational 
levels and the quality of its institutions Pakistan’s economy has performed on 
average relatively better and indeed its growth performance (as measured by  the 
growth of real per capita GDP) has been quite creditable. He then poses the 
important question. What explains the growth performance of Pakistan? 
The model he builds up and tests with cross-country regression analysis 
goes beyond the traditional determinants of growth, namely the levels of 
investment.  He includes in his model the quality of human capital captured by 
educational and health indicators, besides what has now become fairly standard, 
but still difficult to define or measure, namely sound economic policies and 
overall quality of institutions. 
Here I must commend the paper for the excellent review of the literature and 
the open-minded way the author acknowledges the difficulties, relying on recent and 
indeed earlier studies, in explaining what ignites and sustains economic growth. 
 
1I must apologise for the fact that I misplaced the original comments that I made on the paper at 
the Conference.  I have tried to reproduce what I can recall of the comments I made  but it is possible that 
on re-reading the paper I may now be adding some additional comments which were not originally made 
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Indeed it is somewhat unfortunate that he does not go back to some of the interesting 
insights that his literature review reveals in interpreting the results of his cross-
country analysis although I acknowledge the difficulties he may face in doing so.  I 
refer especially to the study covered in his review by Hausmann, Prittchet and 
Rodrik (2004) which finds that a country has a one-in-four chance to experience a 
growth acceleration sometimes during a decade but that these bursts tend to be 
highly unpredictable and that the vast majority of growth takeoffs are unrelated to 
standard determinants such as an increase in investment or trade. Also interesting is 
the review on the relationship between economic growth and the quality of labour as 
reflected in educational or skill levels  and the important caveat the author makes 
that return on investment in education or skills development is closely linked to or 
dependent on the availability of suitable infrastructure, sound institutions and indeed 
an overall growth promoting environment.
2 
As in the review of the growth literature, where the author acknowledges that 
there is some “good news” and  some “bad news”, the implications of the results of  
his cross-country analysis for Pakistan has both “good” and “bad” news.  Somewhat 
sadly, however, there is “no news” to explain why Pakistan has done as well as it 
has!  
The good news from Pakistan’s point of view is that it has done fairly well in 
achieving the growth rate that it has in comparison with other developing countries 
despite its relatively poor social, economic and institutional indicators.  The bad 
news is that its performance could have indeed been even better, as was the case of a 
number of South-east Asian economies, if it had improved on these indicators. 
What then explains Pakistan’s above average economic performance in the 
period 1980–2002 and indeed the spurt in economic growth in the more recent period 
2002-2005? Is it that we are not measuring well the explanatory variables or/and that 
we are leaving out some critical factor or factors which could solve Pakistan’s 
growth puzzle? 
As regards the former (i.e. measuring accurately the explanatory variables) 
and this is becoming all the more controversial when we try to explain Pakistan’s 
economic performance in the more recent years i.e. 2002–2005, are the official 
estimates of investment, a key variable in explaining both absolute and relative 
growth performance.   As my friend Dr Naved Hamid, who was Asian Development 
Bank’s lead economist in Islamabad during 2002–2006, repeatedly pointed out that 
“we see investments taking place all over the economy except in the statistics”!  
While the difficulties of measuring the overall level of investment in Pakistan 
as in any other developing country is well acknowledged, especially private 
investment, showing conclusive proof of this is somewhat more difficult although it 
is an exercise which should be seriously undertaken especially for the more recent 
 
2This was an important conclusion reached by the ILO’s World Employment Report, 1997-98, on 
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years when it is claimed that investments in telecommunications and some other new 
fast growing sectors were not being fully reflected in the official investment series. 
That said, it could be argued that the recent spurt in economic growth is the result of 
better capacity utilisation of the existing capital stock and without new and therefore 
higher levels of investment not sustainable.
3  While growth has slightly dipped in the 
last year i.e. 2005-06 it is still early to test out this hypothesis. 
On the social indicators i.e. literacy, education and health indicators there is 
little dispute of Pakistan’s very poor performance. Yet I might add here that formal 
educational levels and skill levels of a work force, mostly acquired on-the-job, may 
not always be closely related and this is perhaps true to some extent in Pakistan 
where the traditional ustaad-shagird system has been the main vehicle of acquiring 
skill for mostly poorly educated workers. But this in no way deters from the fact that 
Pakistan’s economic performance definitely suffers due to its poor education and 
health  indicators and, as the author points out it now faces severe skill shortages as 
economic growth has spurted in recent years.  
What then of good economic management and quality of  institutions? The 
author uses the level of inflation as a proxy for the former and an index built on the 
average of four indicators rescaled from 1-12, including bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, rule of law and government stability. On inflation levels as reflecting 
good economic management there is obviously room for doubt especially when one 
views Pakistan’s economic performance post-1999 when the first three years 
witnessed little growth with low rates of inflation and post-2002 has seen high 
growth rates with high inflation rates.  Yet overall, with caveats, one could live with 
it in a cross-country analysis. 
On the quality of its institutions again it would take a lot to disagree with the 
measure that shows that Pakistan does not perform well.  In this context it may be of 
some interest to note that if one views Pakistan’s growth performance over the last 
almost now sixty years, except for the early years of the 1950s, Pakistan’s economy 
on the growth front has performed  much better under a military or semi-military rule 
than under a democratically elected civilian government. This contrast is especially 
apparent when we compare the period 1988-98 when Pakistan went through a period 
of democratically elected governments with the post-1999 rule of  General Parvez 
Musharraf.   
 I raise this issue because it does find some resonance with the review by the 
author of the recent literature on “growth accelerations” and the study by Hausmann, 
et al. (2004) cited earlier that finds growth accelerations being correlated amongst 
others with “political regime changes”.  An important point the Hausmann study 
makes is that growth accelerations tend to be highly unpredictable and as Rodrick 
 
3Dr Mohsin Khan made this point in his concluding remarks following the discussion on his 
paper. Comments  475
(2003), again cited by the author, argues that “igniting economic growth and 
sustaining it are two quite different things”.   
I make this slight detour not to suggest that we equate “military-rule” with 
good economic management or for that matter good governance even in the context 
of Pakistan where we have seen that spurts of economic growth under such rule have 
been followed by serious economic and political upheavals (e.g. break-up of Pakistan 
following Ayub’s almost 11 years of military rule), to which the military intervention 
may itself have contributed.  The point really is that while you could have better 
economic management under a military rule which employs competent technical 
economic mangers (as did Gen. Musharraf on taking over) and is subject far less to 
accommodate “unreasonable” economic demands thrown up in a democratic polity 
there is still no guarantee of such an economic upturn being economically 
sustainable or politically desirable in terms of its long term consequences. 
Let us now turn to the second part of the study and raise a query. To what 
extent can you rely on a study to identify factors which could contribute to “Pakistan 
entering a virtuous cycle of high growth and improved living conditions of the 
population” based on results which explains very well the relative growth 
performance of a large sample of developing countries (including Pakistan) but 
ultimately explain very little of Pakistan’s past economic performance?  Here I must 
confess that my answer, even though a guarded one, is very much “Yes” you can.  
The factors which the study identifies based on the cross-country analysis may not 
explain well the past but are all of critical importance if Pakistan is to enter this 
virtuous cycle.  And in a fast changing highly competitive global economy 
improving the quality of its human resources is going to be critical, as the study 
points out, if Pakistan is to achieve or sustain high rates of economic growth. 
So to end, there is much to learn from this well crafted study and indeed much 
which Pakistan’s policy-makers can draw upon. But are we anywhere near to solving 
the “mystery” or “puzzle” (as the author terms it) of Pakistan’s relatively good past 
growth performance?  The answer is that we still have a long way to go.  After all 
what good is a “mystery” if you can “solve it” with some simple or even multiple 
regression analysis!       
 
Rashid Amjad 







Dr Khan has presented an insightful paper on the relationship between human 
capital and economic growth in Pakistan. The issue is of considerable interest for 
developing countries like Pakistan that are faced with the challenge of improving 
their growth prospects on a sustained basis through investments in physical and 
human resources. The analysis is based on the estimation of cross-country growth 
regressions derived from a standard Cobb-Douglas production function which is 
augmented to include quality of labour. Besides indicators of human capital, the 
model specification includes investment, initial income, macroeconomic policy, and 
institutional quality as key determinants of economic growth. The results show that 
economic growth is influenced positively and significantly by indicators that reflect 
the quality of human capital such as average years of schooling, school enrollment, 
literacy rate, and life expectancy at birth. The evidence of a strong negative 
relationship between initial income and economic growth confirms the hypothesis of 
convergence. Similarly, macroeconomic stability and quality of institutions is found 
to have a significant and favourable impact on economic growth. These findings are 
mostly in line with earlier cross country studies of economic growth. 
To begin with, let me highlight two distinguishing features of the study. First, 
the paper ties in three strands of literature on economic growth, and thus offers 
insights into a number of fundamental questions that have long occupied analysts 
and growth theorists. On the one hand, the paper captures elements of new or 
endogenous growth theory by emphasising the role of human capital in the process 
of economic growth. The new growth theory focuses on human capital as a key 
driver of innovations and as a facilitator for the adoption of new technologies. 
Despite the lack of strong empirical support for the endogenous growth theory at the 
macro level, which has been partly attributed to the difficulty in devising an 
appropriate measure of human capital, its theoretical predictions continue to receive 
wide support in academic and policy circles. 
Second, the paper blends with the literature that emphasises the role of 
institutions in economic development and growth, the so-called “institutionalist” 
school of thought. In recent years, the role of institutions has received a great deal of 
attention among growth theorists, who stress that institutions such as property rights, 
rule of law, and markets, etc. play an important role in the process of economic 
growth. It is argued that these institutions reduce information costs, encourage 
capital formation and capital mobility, and allow risks to be priced and shared, all of 
which positively influence economic growth. Also, there is a strong view that Comments 
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countries with better institutions, more secure property rights, and less distortionary 
policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and will use these factors 
more efficiently to achieve a greater level of income. These views have been 
confirmed empirically by many studies which demonstrate that various indicators of 
institutional quality including participatory and democratic institutions, the rule of 
law, and social insurance are important determinants of economic growth. Recent 
research on the role of institutions has attempted to look deeper into the sources of 
institutional differences across countries, the channels through which institutions 
may affect economic performance, and the quantitative importance of these links. 
Third, the paper addresses the issue of convergence that has been extensively 
debated in the literature and the central question here is whether there has been a 
tendency for real per capita income differences between rich and poor countries to 
narrow significantly over the long run. Since poorer countries are generally 
considered to have capital-labour ratios below their long-run optimum, their rate of 
return on fixed investment should be higher than in richer countries. Consequently, 
there should be a systematic tendency for poorer countries to grow faster than rich 
countries until they have “caught up” with the levels of income per head in the latter. 
From an economic policy point of view, the issue of convergence or divergence is 
very important. In the case of rapid convergence, this would point to the functioning 
of market forces, which will eventually lead to similar living standards across 
countries. In the case of slow convergence or persistently large or widening gaps 
between poor and rich countries, there could be a need for economic policy measures 
to stimulate a catch-up process.  
The second notable feature of the paper is that it brings the issue of poverty 
into the spotlight alongside the human capital-economic growth nexus. This is 
particularly relevant for developing countries like Pakistan where poverty remains a 
major challenge. Human capital is both the means and an end of economic growth. 
While human capital is a powerful engine of economic growth, the ultimate aim of 
economic development and growth is improvement in human welfare in terms of 
improved education, health and income opportunities. Therefore, investing in human 
capital can help achieve the dual objectives of higher growth and better economic 
prospects especially for the poor.  
The paper spells out three major implications of the analysis for Pakistan. 
First, in view of the fact that public spending on education and health has been 
historically low in Pakistan, there is considerable scope for enhancing growth 
through investing more in human capital. It is rightly emphasised that priority must 
be accorded to primary and secondary education and basic healthcare, and social 
spending must be targeted so as to ensure that the poorer segments of society also 
have adequate access to public education and healthcare. Second, increased social 
spending must go hand in hand with improvement in the efficiency of public 
expenditures. Third, there is a need to increase private and public investment Musleh-ud Din 
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together with efforts to improve the institutional framework. These measures would 
not only help Pakistan sustain its growth momentum in the medium to long term but 
also contribute to an improvement in the living conditions of the poor.  
While I agree with the conclusions and the policy implications, I would like to 
add that the need for human resource development is all the more compelling in the 
context of increasing global economic integration. In a highly competitive global 
market, the developing countries like Pakistan can not hope to compete effectively 
and diversify their production base without imparting the requisite skills to their 
workers. In the case of Pakistan, research has shown that there is a mismatch 
between supply of and demand for various types of skills. There is, therefore, a need 
to develop and support demand-driven skill development programmes which would 
help the country maximise the gains from improved market access made possible by 
a liberal global trading regime. 
To conclude, I would like to congratulate Dr Khan on presenting a thoughtful 
paper on the role of human capital in the growth process. The paper is a valuable 
contribution to the growth literature and is expected to generate further interest and 
debate on the issues raised in the paper. 
 
   Musleh-ud  Din 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
Islamabad. 